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Plaintiff herewith replies to the amici curiae brief of the
Utah Manufacturers Association, Utah Petroleum Association and
the Utah Mining Association.

These are referred to hereinafter

as Associations.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Does

the

language

of

the

1975

amendment

to Utah Code

Annotated, § 35-1-62; the legislative history of such amendment
and the pertinent cases of the Utah Supreme Court prior to and
following such amendment uphold Plaintiff-Appellant's right to
sue a subcontractor and general contractor for negligence who are
not her actual employer on the construction site.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Senate Bill 2 6 was introduced in the Utah State Senate with
Senator Pettersson as chief sponsor on January 14, 1975.
purposes

of

such

bill

were

to

amend

the

Utah

The

Workmen's

Compensation Act and, in particular, insofar as the instant case
is concerned, Section 35-1-62 Utah Code Annotated.

(Page 69

Senate Journal 1975.)
The

Senate

Committee

Development favorably

on

Labor,

Business

&

Economic

recommended the Bill to the Senate.

The

second reading of Senate Bill 2 6 occurred on February 25, 1975.
Persons testifying before the Senate, which at the time was
acting as a committee of the whole, were Messers. Lynn Richards,
Frank Lay, Steve Hadley, Blair Kinnersley, Erie Berman and Paul
Kunz.

(Page 770 Senate Journal 1975.)
1

Mr. Richards testified on

behalf of management and Mr. Berman testified on behalf of the
Utah Mining Association-

Mr. Steve Hadley testified on behalf of

the Utah Industrial Commission and Mr. Paul Kunz testified on
behalf

of

the Utah

Bar Association

as

its President.

(Disc

recordings Senate Secretary (191 and 192)
The only substantive discussion and explanation of Senate
Bill 2 6 that concerned the effect and purpose of the amendment to
Section 35-1-62 occurred during testimony of Mr. Kunz. (Addendum
Transcript of Senate Secretary Disc. 192)
The third reading of Senate Bill 26 occurred on March 3,
1975. (Page 853 Senate Journal 1975)
Senate bill

26 was passed by the Senate March 3, 1975

without a dissenting vote in the form of the proposed amendment
to Section 35-1-62 as initially introduced.
Journal 1975)

(Page 864 Senate

It was sent to the House of Representatives which

passed said bill March 5, 1975 without amendment.

It was signed

by the President of the Senate on the same date and transmitted
to the governor.

(Page 955 1975 Senate Journal)

The amendment

became law on March 19, 1975 when signed by the Governor.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The language of the 1975 amendment to Section 35-1-62, when
compared with the then existing language of said section, and
Utah Supreme court cases before and after 1975 demonstrates that
the

Utah

Legislature

intended

that

an

injured

subcontractor

employee on a construction project could have no tort action for
damages against his actual employer but could
2

sue all other

contractor entities thereon not meeting the test of being his
actual employer.
The foregoing intent of the Utah Legislature is also clearly
shown in testimony before the Senate during debate on amending
Sec. 35-1-62 on February 25, 1975.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE INTENT OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE IN AMENDING UCA SEC.
35-1-62 IN 1975 WAS TO PERMIT TORT ACTIONS BY AN INJURED
EMPLOYEE OF A
SUBCONTRACTOR AGAINST OTHER SUB OR GENERAL
CONTRACTORS
WHO
NEGLIGENTLY
CAUSE
HIS
INJURIES
IS
DEMONSTRATED BY THE AMENDMENTS' LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.
The pertinent terms of Section 35-1-62 as passed in 1939,
which were amended in 1975 by Senate Bill 26, read as follows:
"When any injury or death for which compensation is
payable under this title shall have been caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another person not in the
same emp1oyment, the injured employee...may also have
an action for damages against such third person."
(emphasis added)
The 1975 amendment to section 3 5-1-62 reads as follows:
"For the purpose of this section and notwithstanding
the provisions of section 35-1-42, the injured employee
.... may also maintain an action for damages against
subcontractors,
general
contractors,
independent
contractors, property owners or their lessees or
assigns,
not
occupying
an
employee-employer
relationship with the injured or deceased employee at
the time of his injury or death." (emphasis added)
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-42, which was not amended
in 1975, apparently

intended

to define "statutory employers"

according to historical concepts surrounding such term.

This

Section along with UCA Sec. 35-1-62 Pre-1975 led the Utah Supreme
Court to rule that generally an injured subcontractor employee
could not have a tort action against other subcontractors or the
3

general contractor
project.

The

subcontractors

if they were engaged

rationale

appeared

and general

in work on the same

to

contractors

be

that

all

on the job

other

site were

perforce "in the same employment" and thus "statutory employers"
immune

from

suit

or

that

a

general

contractor,

at

least,

exercised sufficient control over a subcontractor's employees to
be immune.
Noteworthy

decisions

so holding

were

Adamson

v.

Okland

Construction Company, Inc., 508 P.2nd 805 (Utah, 1973) and Smith
v. Alfred Brown Co., 493 P.2nd 994 (Utah, 1972).
these

decisions

recovery

by

an

was

to

injured

limit,

for

employee

to

all

The effect of

practical

workmen's

purposes,

compensation

benefits no matter how grievously he was injured by the wrongful
neglect of other contractors on the job.
The 1975 amendment of section 35-1-62 eliminated the words
"not in the same employment" and substituted

the words "not

occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or
deceased employee.."

Inasmuch as the Utah Code already defined

"statutory employer" in section 35-1-42, both before and after
1975, such amendment is redundant unless the legislature intended
to permit an injured employee to sue any other contractor on the
project, but his actual employer, whose negligence injured him.
That the 1975 legislature, intended to permit suits as set
forth above and to reverse the result of the Adamson and Smith
cases, supra, is established by the legislative history.

The

only debate and testimony on the Senate floor that touched upon
4

the purposes of the 1975 amendment of section 35-1-62 is set out
in the transcript attached to this Brief as an Addendum.

The

following portions of such transcript should be noted:
"The law that was passed in 1921 had the wording
'wrongful act of a third person1. In 1939 the words
•third person1 were taken out and substituted....1 the
wrongful act or neglect of another person not in the
same employment.'
"....The situation prior to the change was that if two
men were working on a project and one was employed by a
general contractor and a third person could be an
employee of a subcontractor ...who came on the job and
injured the employee...such employee... had a right of
action against the wrongdoer for his damages in
addition to his compensation..."
"The result of changing this language from 'third
person1 to 'not in the same employment' has resulted in
a number of court decisions that have completely
eliminated the protection that the worker had..."
"...There is a great deal of safety in men who are
concerned for each other, who work for the same
employer, who work under the same conditions.
They
come under the same foreman's inspection and so on."
"It is a matter of clarification so that the injured
man will know that, of course, he has no right of
action against his own employer but when a stranger
comes on the job whether it be a subcontractor, whether
it be a delivery man or whether it be a stranger is
subject to the same rules of safety and to the same
obligation of law as to the injured man that any other
stranger would be (under)..." (emphasis added)
During the course of his testimony Senator Warren Pugh asked
Mr. Kunz:
"Are you in favor of this amendment?"
Mr Kunz replied:
"Yes, I am Senator.
I think its a matter of simple
justice that and also a matter of safety. This would
permit third party suits but of course it would not
permit suits against the employer as the law now
5

stands.
The amendment would
permitting third party suits,"

have

the

effect

of

It should be noted that the Senate subcommittee on Labor
favorably reported out the 1974 amendment to section 35-1-62 and
that such amendment passed the Senate unanimously except for
three absent members.

Furthermore, representatives of management

and the Utah Mining Association as well as one from the AFL-CIO
and Mr. Kunz testified before the Senate on February 25, 1975.
No dissent was raised by any Association spokesman to the wording
of the section 35-1-62 amendment or to the remarks of Mr. Kunz.
Representatives of the AFL-CIO and the Associations testified
before the Senate Labor Committee prior to said date.
II. UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE 1975
AMENDMENT OF SECTION 35-1-62 INDICATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO PERMIT THE INJURED EMPLOYEE OF ONE
CONTRACTOR TO SUE OTHER CONTRACTORS ON THE PROJECT WHOSE
NEGLIGENCE INJURES HIM
Under the 1975 amendment of 35-1-62 the injured employee
cannot sue his actual employer for damages and as to such he is
limited to compensation benefits.
right

to

bring

a

tort

action

The employee, however, has a
in damages

against any other

contractor entity on the project who negligently injures him.
This is shown to be so in Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Co., 54 6
P.2nd 896

(Utah, 1976).

This involved the tort action of an

injured employee of a subcontractor against a contractor entity
on the job site who was not his actual employer.

The Court

ruled that, inasmuch as the injury occurred prior to 1975 the
1975 amendment to section 35-1-62 did not apply.

It found that

the pre-1975 terms of said section "not in the same employment"
6

barred his suit against another contractor on the same project.
This was in accordance with the Adamson and Smith cases, supra.
The Court noted however that if the 1975 amendment had been
applicable the plaintiff could have had a right to be in court
against a contractor entity on the project other than his actual
employer.
The following language from the decision of the Court in
Shupe appears significant:
"...In both of those cases the contractor, by the terms
of the contracts, retained supervision and control over
the subcontractors."
"...We do not believe that in this case the plaintiffs'
decedent was an employee of the general contractor
rather than being an employee of the subcontractor as
was the case in Smith and Adamson...1
"The legislature, undoubtedly being aware of the
decisions of this court construing the terms "same
employment" in 1975 amended Section 35-1-62 U.C.A. 1953
by adding the following provision: (emphasis added)
For
the
purposes
of
this
section
and
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35-1-42,
the injured employee or his heirs or personal
representatives may also maintain an action for
damages
against
subcontractors,
general
contractors, independent contractors, property
owners or their lessees or assigns, not occupying
an employee-employer relationship with the injured
or deceased employee at the time of his injury or
death.
"The amendment if applicable would leave the plaintiff
in court." (emphasis added)
It appears clear from the foregoing language that this Court
recognizes that it was the intent of the 1975 legislature in
amending section 35-1-62 to overturn the effects of Adamson and
Smith, supra, to permit a suit by an injured employee against
7

other contractors on the site who injured him and who were not
his employer in a direct sense.
Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. , 577 P. 2nd 561 (Utah,
1978) holds that the employee of a subcontractor (Hinds) who was
injured by the negligence of another subcontractor (Hughes)on the
same job could have properly sued such entity provided Hughes did
not directly supervise and control the work done by Hinds as an
actual employer.
one who

An actual employer is generally deemed to be

hires, fires, pays

employee's

work

equivalent.

through

and

controls the details of an

supervision

by

a

foreman

or

the

The decision therefore sent the case back to the

trial court for a determination as to whether or not Hinds under
the circumstances was in fact under such control by Hughes that
Hinds was an actual employee of Hughes.
An injured employee may not bring a tort action against his
actual employer.

This exclusion, however, should be limited to

that employer who hires, fires, compensates and controls all
details of his employment and not to one who only has some
general, indirect or tangential control.
once

more

preclude

proper

tort

To rule otherwise would

actions

against

third

party

wrongdoers by injured employees and would emasculate the clearly
expressed

intent

of

the

legislature

in

enacting

the

1975

amendment to section 35-1-62.
III.

THE CONTROLLING PUBLIC POLICY IN THIS CASE IS THAT
EXPRESSED BY THE UTAH LEGISLATURE IN ITS 1975 AMENDMENT
OF SECTION 35-1-62.

8

The

amicus

brief

of

the Associations

presents what is

essentially a plea that this Court should adopt public policy and
philosophical views of other states or those of A. Larson in his
work entitled "Workmen's Compensation Law."
Such views might be probative in the absence of direct,
contrary language chosen by the Utah Legislature in 1975 and/or
in the absence of decisions of this Court holding otherwise.

In

fact the only philosophy or public policy that counts in this
case is that expressed by the Utah Legislature's language in its
1975 amendment to section 35-1-62.

This, although it might be

contrary to the views of A. Larson, demonstrates that, as a
matter

of public

policy, Utah

intends to permit an injured

subcontractor employee to sue in tort any other contractor entity
on the project who negligently injures him and who is not his
actual employer as contrasted to a mere "statutory employer."
Policy considerations in workmen's compensation cases cannot
be applied by the courts to controvert the clear meaning of the
statutory language that pertains to the issue concerned.

Tisco

Intermountain & State Insurance Fund v. Industrial Commission of
Utah. Case No. 20913, decided September 29, 1987.
It should also be noted that other writers who voice public
policy views as to workmen's compensation laws differ from those
expressed by A. Larson.

Attention is invited to a treatise in

the Harvard Law Review, Vol. 96, pages 1641 to 1661, entitled
"Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers'
Compensation Statutes."
9

The

foregoing

treatise

devotes

itself

to

specified

exceptions which are not pertinent here which permit an employee
to bring a tort action against his actual employer.

Nevertheless

the public policy bases given as to these exceptions are worthy
of note.
The Harvard Law review treatise, supra, summarizes at the
outset the writer's view as follows:
"The continuing challenges to the exclusive remedy rule
reveal an underlying tension between the workers1
compensation system and the tort system.
This Note
examines the workers' compensation system as a response
to the problem of work-related accidents and evaluates
the significance and merit of the emerging exceptions
to the exclusive remedy rule. The Note concludes that
judicial resistance to worker tort suits has been
excessive and that a more receptive
attitude toward
the doctrines underlying such suits would be both
desirable and legitimate. " (Page 1641.)
It

should

be

noted

that

the writer of the Note would

perforce favor the right of an injured employee to sue in tort
any

other

contractor

injures him.

entity

on the project

who

negligently

The writer points out that permitting tort actions

against contractors on a project other than the actual employer
would, contrary to the views expressed by the Associations amicus
brief, foster and enhance workplace safety.

Clearly a general

contractor or subcontractor who negligently injures the employee
of another contractor would be far more likely to enforce safe
worksite standards if they knew they could be subject to tort
liability if they negligently acted.

The Note states:

"Employers are the appropriate party to bear accident
costs, because they have greater control over workplace
hazards than do workers and are generally better able
to take preventive measures. Even to the extent that
10

worker behavior contributes to workplace accidents,
however, imposing these costs on workers would have a
negligible effect on safety. Workers have a built-in
incentive to behave safely—self preservation—that
influence their actions much more than does the
financial aftermath of accidents." (Pages 1646 and
1647)
"....Thus, by failing to impose the full cost of workrelated
accidents
on
employers,
the
workers1
compensation
system
creates
inadequate
economic
incentives for workplace safety." (Page 1647)
"The present workers' compensation system is thus
unsatisfactory both as a means of providing adequate
relief to injured workers and as a mechanism for
creating the proper incentive for the reduction of
accidents and related costs. In defense of the system,
commentators
argue
that
worker's
compensation
originated as a bargain between employers and employees
that was never intended to provide full compensation.
Recently, however, dissatisfaction with the present
state of the workers' compensation system has led some
courts to reassess that bargain and to address existing
deficiencies in workers' compensations law by acceding
to employee efforts to establish exceptions to the
exclusive remedy rule..." (Page 1648)
Third party suits against contractors on a project other
than the actual employer are clearly approved of by the author of
the Note.

At page 1651 he writes:
"...When an accident is caused partly by a third party,
the injured worker can sue that party for the entire
amount of injury-related damages, no matter how small
the third party's role in the accident...."

The Note concluded that additional tort recovery would be
equitable; it would contribute to compensation objectives and to
proper safety incentives; statutory immunity should be construed
narrowly and in light of history and policy every presumption
should be on the side of preserving common law rights in the
absence

of

compelling

justification.

statutory

(Page 1654)
11

language

or

social

policy

Attention

is

invited

to

the

decision

in

Young

Environmental Air Products, 665 P.2nd 40 (Arizona, 1983)

v.

There

the Court said:
"We recognize that when the statutory employer concept
is used as a device to immunize a remote employer, the
objective of the Workmen's Compensation Act is not
advanced, since1 the purpose of the Act is to protect
the employee rather than the employer." Page 45.
The

Court

in

Young

pointed

out

that

the

workmens'

compensation statute should be strictly construed when used to
deny an employee his common law rights to sue for tort damages.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff herein should be permitted a tort action suit
against the subcontractor and general contractor neither of whom
had any right to nor did they exercise any control over her work.
Plaintiff was hired, paid and controlled by placer's Inc., whom
she did not sue.
Plaintiff should be permitted her suit herein because the
1975

amendment

expressly

gave

Legislature's

of

section

her

use

such

of

the

35-1-62

right.
words

by

the

This

is

"not

Utah

Legislature

evidenced

occupying

by

the

an employee-

employer relationship with the injured employee" instead of "in
the same employment."
The

foregoing

intent

is

established

by

the

History of the 1975 amendment of section 35-1-62.

Legislative
The only

person to testify as to the purpose of such amendment clearly
points out it was intended to reverse prior court decisions and

12

to permit third party suits.

In the context of this the only

tort immunity given is to the employee's actual employer.
The Hinds case, supra, and the Shupe case, supra, indicate
UCA 35-1-62 authorizes an injured employee to bring an action
against all other contractors on the job other than those who are
his actual employer.
Finally, the public policy of the State of Utah has been
established
amendment

by the Utah
to

subsequently

section
enunciated.

Legislature's
35-1-62

and

The

enactment
this

of the 1975

Court's

philosophical

views

decisions
of

the

Associations and expressions of public policy principles to the
contrary are therefore irrelevant.

In any event, valid public

policy arguments fully support a broadened right in employees to
sue third party tort feasors on a project other than those in
an actual employer relationship with the injured employee.
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of December, 1987.

Wp^rord A. Beesley
^ ^^~^ack Fairclough
^EESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 Deseret Book Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2100
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Scott W. Christensen, Esq.
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Erico Products, Inc.
Robert W. Brandt, Esq.
Michael E. Dyer, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDY, MILLER, NELSON
50 South Main, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Placers, Inc.
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UTAH STATE SENATE
SOPHIA C. BUCKMIIXER
OFFICIAL OFFICER AND
SECRETARY OF THE SENATE
319 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114
PHONE 533-4710, 467-5263

December 10, 1987

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
As

the

Official

Officer

and

Secretary

of

the

Utah

State Senate, I do attest to and certify that the attached
transcript
PETTERSSON,
from
25,

the
1975.

of
et

S.B.
al. ,

Senate
This

No.
is

26,
a

true

recordings,
recording

WORKMEN'S
and

(Disc

was made

COMPENSATION,

actual
No.
on

record

by

taken

192), February
the

Forty-Fourth

day of the General Session of the Forty First Legislature.
Respectfully submitted,

Sophia C. Buckmiller
Official Officer and
Secretary, Utah State Senate

My Commission expires May 1, 1S91

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS AND TESTIMONY IN THE UTAH STATE
SENATE,WHILE SITTING AS A COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, CONCERNING
SENATE BILL 26, AMENDMENTS TO THE WORKMENfS COMPENSATION ACT,
SECOND READING, FEBRUARY 25, 1975 DISC 192.
The Senate Secretary reads the 1975 proposed amendment to
Section 35-1-62 as follows:
"For
the
purposes
of
this
section
and
notwithstanding the provisions of section 35-1-42,
the injured employee or his heirs or personal
representative may also maintain an action for
damages
against
subcontractors,
general
contractors, independent contractors, property
owners or their lessees or assigns, not occupying
an employee-employer relationship with the injured
or deceased employee at the time of his injury or
death".
The Secretary reads the provisions of Section 35-1-62 as
they exist prior to amendment as follows:
"When any injury or death for which compensation
is payable under this title shall have been caused
by the wrongful act or neglect of another person
not in the same employment, the injured employee,
or in case of death his dependents may claim
compensation and the injured employee or his heirs
or personal representative may also have an action
for damages against such third person".
Testimony is given by Paul Kunz, President, Utah Bar
Association, as follows:
"The law that was passed in 1921 had the
wording 'wrongful act of a third person1. In
1939 the words 'third person' were taken out
and substituted therefore read 'the wrongful
act or neglect of another person not in the
same employment".
"Now the result of this change has been that
first let me take the situation prior to the
change.
The situation prior to the change
was that if two men were working on a project
and one was employed by say a general
contractor and a third person could be an
employee of a subcontractor, could be a
delivery man, could be anyone who came on the
job and injured the employee of the general
contractor or killed him, such employee of
the general contractor had a right of action
against the wrongdoer for his damages in

addition to his compensation"•
"Now he didn't recover twice because what he
recovered from the wrongdoer he had to pay
back to the compensation insurance carrier,
the State Fund or the private carrier as the
case may be".
"The result of changing this language from
'third
person'
to
'not
in
the
same
employment' has resulted in a number of court
decisions that have completely eliminated the
protection that the worker had. One of the
important things in the law that has been
mentioned here today is the so-called 'fellow
servant' rule.
There is a great deal of
safety in men who are concerned for each
other who work for the same employer, who
work under the same conditions.
They come
under the same safety rules. They come under
the same foreman's inspection and so on".
"But now that protection is lost when a
stranger comes on the job and hurts them and
the object of the change and this wording is
to change the act to provide that when injury
or death for which compensation is payable
shall have been caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of a person other than an employer or
officer or agent of said employer then the
injured man has his right of action".
"It is a matter of clarification so that the
injured man will know that of course he has
no right of action against his own employer
but when a stranger comes on the job whether
it be a subcontractor, whether it be a
delivery man or whether it be a stranger is
subject to the same rules of safety and to
the same obligation of law as to the injured
man that any other stranger would be if we
were going down the road or under any other
circumstances and that is the purpose of this
amendment".
Senator Warren Pugh asks Mr. Kunz:
"Are you in favor of this amendment?
Mr. Kunz answers:
"Yes, I am Senator.
I think its a matter of simple
justice that and also a matter of safety. This would
permit third party suits but of course it would not

permit suits against the employer as the law now
stands.
The amendment would have the effect of
permitting third party suits".
S B 26 was passed by the Senate on March 3, 1975 and was
sent to the House on a vote of 2 6 ayes, 0 nays and 3 absent.

It

was passed by the House March 5, 1975 without amendment and was
signed by the President of the Senate and transmitted to the
Governor, who signed it into law.

